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I. APPELLANT'S REPLY TO APPELLEES BEATTY AND BULLOCK 
A. AS A MATTER OF POLICY, IF A SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT EXISTS AS 
TO WHICH IS THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE 
LONGER RATHER THAN THE SHORTER PERIOD OF LIMITATION 
IS TO BE PREFERRED. 
The Appellees Beatty and Bullock (Individual Defendants) contend on appeal, as 
they did before the trial court, that Bullock's Complaint fails because it was filed after the statute of 
limitations had run. They maintain that the three year limitation applies and that the period for the statute 
of limitations was not tolled by Appellant's filing in the federal court and they cite to American Theater 
Company vs. Glasmann. 95 Utah 303, 80 P.2d 922 (1938) as controlling. 
The Individual Defendants are correct in their argument that the tolling statute is not 
applicable to the claim made against them, although for reasons other than American Theater Company. 
The tolling statute in question was enacted in 1953, long after the American Theater case was decided. 
U.C.A. § 78-14-40 (1953) provides that where an action is commenced in due time and the action fails 
otherwise upon the merits and the time has expired, the Plaintiff has one year to commence a new action. 
Because the time for bringing the action against the Individual Defendants had not yet expired when 
Bullock's Complaint was dismissed by the Federal Court, the tolling statute is inapplicable to the claims 
against the Individual Defendants. 
One of the main issues before the court is whether the Complaint in the instant case was 
filed after the period of limitations had run. There is no question that Bullock knew that the sale had been 
consummated when he received and negotiated a check disbursing to him some of the proceeds on 
September 18, 1992. There is also no question that the present action was filed on March 1, 1996, some 
three and one-half years after the check was negotiated. 
There is a question, however, as to which statute of limitations is applicable. Because the 
Complaint alleges that the Individual Defendants defrauded Bullock, the Individual Defendants argue that 
the statute of limitations for fraud applies and, therefore, the action should have been brought within three 
years. Because the Complaint alleges other causes of action against the Individual Defendants, notably 
conspiracy to defraud and breach of duties relating to the partnership agreement and partnership statutes, 
Bullock's position is that other statutes of limitations with longer periods are applicable. 
After setting forth the underlying facts, the Complaint identifies ten causes of action against 
the Individual Defendants. The Complaint asks for 1) damages resulting from breach of the partnership 
agreement and conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff of his partnership interest; 2) damages based on conspiracy 
to defraud Plaintiff; 3) damages based on breach of partnership agreement after having received notice 
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of its provisions; 4) damages based on violation of the partnership act; 5) recovery of the partnership 
property; 6) rescission of the contract based on the Defendants' intent to deceive the Plaintiff (The 
Plaintiff also offers to tender back the proceeds of the sale that were received); 7) declaratory judgment 
in determining the parties respective rights; 8) quiet title to the partnership property; 9) damages from 
anguish resulting from intentional conduct; 10) damages for negligence and carelessness. 
The Complaint clearly sets forth the fiduciary relationship between the Individual 
Defendants and Bullock. It clearly alleges a breach of the duties found in the partnership agreement and 
partnership statute. To conclude that the Complaint is based only on fraud is an oversimplification of the 
relief sought by the Complaint. Indeed, this case presents the question as to which of two or more 
statutes of limitations should be applied, the longer or the shorter period. 
This question is addressed in 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitations of Action § 63 at 641, where 
it is stated the following rule: 
As a matter of policy, the view has been taken that where there is a 
substantial question which of two or more statutes of limitation within the 
jurisdiction should be applied, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
application of the statute containing the longest limitation. In other words, 
if a substantial doubt exists as to which is the applicable statute of 
limitations, the longer rather than the shorter period of limitation is to be 
preferred. 
This would appear to be the policy of the Utah Courts. As previously argued in the 
Appellants' Brief pages 10 and 11, where there are multiple theories of recovery under the governmental 
immunity act, the Plaintiff may pursue alternate claims even though some claims may be barred. That 
same policy should be followed here. Even though a claim for fraud must be brought within three years, 
claims for breach of contract and other fiduciary duties have longer periods of limitation. Any doubt as 
3 
to which period applies should be resolved by preference for the longer period. Therefore, the dismissal 
of Bullock's claims against the Individual Defendants because of the three year statute of limitation is 
inappropriate. 
B. WHETHER THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE 
THAT THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE RELEASED FOR 
RATIFICATION IS A QUESTION OF FACT AND PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DISMISSED. 
At the conclusion of the Individual Defendants' arguments concerning ratification, there 
is the statement that "ratification results in release from liability of the person whose acts are being 
approved". This statement does not accurately state the law. As previously argued by Bullock, there are 
two exceptions to the general rule. Those exceptions are 1) when the principal is obligated to affirm the 
act in order to protect his interest; or 2) where the principal is caused to ratify by the misrepresentation 
or duress of the agent. It is recognized that where there is a fiduciary relationship, more is required to 
find ratification sufficient to release the agent from liability for his acts. See Appellant's brief at page 25. 
The Individual Defendants make no attempt to address this issue other than the conclusory 
statement noted above. The partners owed a duty to Bullock to not act in a self-dealing way. As one of 
the general partners, Bullock's consent was necessary to effect any sale of the partnership's only asset, 
even though he resided in California. He voiced his objections to both his partners and the State's 
representatives. Ignoring his objections, the partners proceeded to close the transaction with the State. 
The partners divided the proceeds in a self-dealing way before sending the remaining proceeds to Bullock. 
To protect his interest, Bullock had little choice but to deposit the proceeds and then to make a formal 
demand and tender back the proceeds by the filing of his Complaint. 
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When the trial court dismissed all of Bullock's claims against the Individual Defendants 
based on ratification, it did not take into consideration the exceptions noted above or the heavier burden 
to be imposed in establishing ratification where a fiduciary relationship existed. Instead, the court found 
that because Bullock retained the benefits of the check with knowledge, he ratified the sale to the State 
and thereby released his claims against his partners. The trial court should have looked into why Bullock 
negotiated the check. This is a question of fact that should have been determined at trial and not through 
summary dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
H. APPELLANT'S REPLY TO THE STATE DEFENDANTS 
A. AT THE HEART OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE 
DEFENDANTS IS THE FACT THAT THEY BREACHED THEIR 
CONTRACT TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
The trial court dismissed Bullock's claims against the State Defendant on the grounds that 
his claims were not timely brought under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Whether Bullock's 
action against the State Defendants was timely depends on how his various claims are to be characterized. 
The State Defendants contend that because of the language of the various causes of action, it is clear that 
Bullock's claims are not based on contract. Bullock likewise has referred to the language of his 
Complaint to support his argument that his claims against the State Defendants are based on contract. 
In determining how a Plaintiffs claims should be characterized under the Governmental 
Immunities Act, the courts have looked to what is "at the heart" of the Plaintiffs claims. Gillman v. 
Department of Financial Institutions. 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989). The court must focus on the conduct 
or situation out of which the injury arose and not on the theory of liability crafted by the Plaintiff or the 
type of negligence alleged. DeVilliers v. Utah County 882 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994). The Court 
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should refuse a claim that is drafted in such a way as to attempt to evade the statutory categories by 
recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury. Id. 
In the present case, the difficulty arises in focusing on each separate cause of action apart 
from the allegations of the entire Complaint. Instead of taking each cause of action separately, the court 
must look at what is at the heart of the Plaintiffs claims. Bullock alleged that the State Defendants 
negotiated with his partners for the sale of the partnership property without his consent and that prior to 
the closing of the sale, he discussed his concerns about the sale with the State Defendants and notified 
them that his consent was necessary before any deeds could be signed. Bullock believed that the State 
could not and would not go further with the negotiations with his partners without his input. 
Instead of addressing Bullock's concerns, the State Defendants ignored him and continued 
to negotiate the sale with the other partners who did not voice any objection. Subsequently, knowing that 
they did not have Bullock's consent, they caused the partnership property to be deeded to the State. Their 
conduct was such that they did not act in good faith or in fair dealing with Bullock. This is a breach of 
the contract it had entered into with the partnership. See Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah App. 
1994). (Every contract has a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied as a term of that contract.) 
By their actions, the State Defendants were able to purchase partnership assets far below their fair market 
value. Their conduct also allowed the other two partners to deal with Bullock in a self-serving manner. 
As a result, Bullock lost more than the fair market value of his interest in the partnership property. 
This is what is at the heart of Bullock's claims. All of his damages and theories for 
recovery flow from the fact that the State Defendants ignored his objection and proceeded to acquire the 
partnership asset without his consent. It is because of these actions that Bullock claimed that the sale is 
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invalid, that the Defendants conspired against him, that the property should be returned and that the court 
determine the parties' rights under the contract. Therefore, Bullock's damages are a direct consequence 
of the State Defendants acting in bad faith under their contract. If this court looks at the heart of 
Plaintiffs claims, it is all the more apparent that the trial court erred in dismissing Bullock's claims based 
on the Governmental Immunity Act. 
B. BULLOCK'S STATUS AS AN INTENDED THIRD PARTY 
BENEFICIARY PERMITS HIM TO SEEK RECOVERY UNDER THE 
CONTRACT. 
The State Defendants challenge Bullock's standing as an intended third party beneficiary 
on the basis that this issue was not raised with the trial court below and that Bullock has not shown in the 
record where his interest was anything more than incidental to the contract between the Partnership and 
the State. The argument that Bullock cannot raise an issue that has not been raised below is a double-
edged sword for the State Defendants. In arguing against the State's Motion to Dismiss, Bullock asserted 
that the time constraints of the Governmental Immunity Act do not apply where his Complaint could be 
characterized as being based on contractual rights. The State Defendants never challenged Bullock's 
standing to make that assertion. Rather, the State Defendants maintained that the Complaint could not 
be characterized as being based on a contract. Therefore, the parties assumed Bullock had standing to 
sue on his claims, however characterized. Not having challenged that standing below, if the State's logic 
is to be followed, the State cannot challenge that standing on appeal. (This same logic applies to the 
State's argument that State employees are not "entities" as defined by statute and therefore not subject 
to Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-5.) 
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In any event, the court should distinguish this case from those situations where a defense 
was not argued or raised even though asserted in the pleadings. Here, the arguments concerning 
contractual rights were raised, although assumptions were made that Bullock had standing to assert those 
arguments. As a result, the issue of Bullock's standing to sue on claims that were based on contractual 
rights was implicitly part of the arguments made to the trial court and can property be reviewed by this 
court. 
Bullock's status as an intended third party beneficiary should be clear as far as the State's 
Motion to Dismiss is concerned. To determine that status, the court must look to the intent of the 
contracting parties. That intent to confer a separate and distinct benefit on the third party beneficiary 
must be clear. American Towers Owners v. CCI Mechanical. 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996). Although 
the intent must be clear, it need not necessarily be expressly stated in the written contract. Vista Co. v. 
Columbia Pictures Industries. Inc.. 725 F. Supp. 1286 (SDNY 1989). The Restatement states the law 
as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a 
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the 
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either 
a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the 
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary or; 
b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the 
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. 
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 302, cited in Continental 111. Nat. Bank v. Allen. 811 P.2d 
168 (Utah 1991). 
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In the present case the facts are clear that Bullock's status as a partner was known to the 
State Defendants. Bullock communicated with the State Defendants over the telephone and through the 
mail. The State Defendants knew that, as a partner, Bullock was entitled to receive part of the proceeds 
realized from the sale of the partnership property. Just as the court found with the partners in Vista Co.. 
supra, these facts are enough to survive the State's Motion to Dismiss. At the very minimum, there is 
a question of fact as to whether uthe circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the 
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance." 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in granting the Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss based on 
ratification and the statute of limitations. It also erred in granting the State's Defendants Motion to 
Dismiss based on the Governmental Immunity Act. The trial court's Orders dismissing Appellant's 
Complaint must be reversed. Contrary to the State's position, it is Appellant's belief that oral argument 
would benefit the proper disposition of this case. 
Respectfully submitted this {L day of April, 1998. 
KEVIN V. OLSEN 
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff Richard Bullock 
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